DePaul Law Review
Volume 18
Issue 1 Fall 1968

Article 12

Anti-Trust - Railroad Mergers - A Matter of Public Interest
Gilbert Schroeder

Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review

Recommended Citation
Gilbert Schroeder, Anti-Trust - Railroad Mergers - A Matter of Public Interest, 18 DePaul L. Rev. 272 (1968)
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol18/iss1/12

This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Digital Commons@DePaul. It
has been accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons@DePaul. For
more information, please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu.

CASE NOTES
ANTI-TRUST-RAILROAD MERGERS-A MATTER
OF PUBLIC INTEREST
On March 2, 1962, the New York Central Railroad Company (NYC)
and the Pennsylvania Railroad Company (PRR) filed applications with
the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) pursuant to law,' seeking
permission to merge their facilities into one company, the PennsylvaniaNew York Central Transportation Company (Penn-Central). Hearings
began in August, 1962, and the Commission's Examiners issued their report on March 29, 1965, recommending approval of the merger subject
to certain conditions. The Commission adopted in general the findings of
its Examiners as its own in its report of April 6, 1966,2 and authorized
consummation of the merger on May 31, 1966. Numerous parties expressed dissatisfaction with the report and order, and filed petitions for
reconsideration with the Commission, which then deferred the effective
date from May 31st to September 30th. On August 29th the Commission refused to postpone this further, although its Report on Reconsideration had not yet been issued, whereupon Erie-Lackawanna Railroad Company brought suit to enjoin the merger.3 The Commission then issued its
Report on Reconsideration on September 19, 1966, 4 which varied from its
earlier report in several respects, but which did not alter the effective date
of September 30, 1966. The injunction sought was denied by the district
court, but on appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that the Commission had authorized immediate consum149

U.S.C. § 5(2) (1964).

2

Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 327 I.C.C. 475, 481-82 (1966).
8Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 259 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). This
action eventually came to include, by intervention and consolidation, as plaintiffs: Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company (B. & 0.), Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company (C. & 0.), Norfolk and Western Railway Company (N. & W.), Central Railroad
Company of New Jersey (C.N.J.), Reading Company (Reading), Delaware and Hudson
Railroad Corporation (D. & H.), Boston and Maine Railroad Company (B. & M.), Chicago and Eastern Illinois Railroad Company (C. & E.I.), Western Maryland Railway
Company (W.M.), Milton J. Shapp (Shapp), City of Scranton (Scranton) and another
not pertinent; as defendants: United States of America, PRR, NYC, the Trustees of
the New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company (NH), and others not
here pertinent.
4
Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger--New York Cent. R.R., 328 I.C.C. 304 (1966).
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mation of a merger which, in view of its own findings, failed to fulfill the
statutory mandate.5 With numerous events intervening, the Commission
again approved the merger, supposedly in accordance with the Supreme
Court's opinion, on June 9, 1967.0 Again various parties instituted an action to enjoin the merger, 7 the injunction was denied, and the denial appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which on this occasion affirmed the decision of the lower court. Penn-Central Merger and N. & W.
Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
Within the last decade the problem of railroad mergers has come rather
suddenly to the fore. The Penn-Central merger would be significant
merely from the fact that the two roads, as the Supreme Court recognized, "dominate rail transportation in the Northeast," 8 but it is worthy
of comment more broadly by virtue of what it portends for the future.
The purpose of this note is to briefly explore the history of railroad
mergers in the United States; the background of the instant case; the
main arguments advanced against the Penn-Central merger, 9 as indicative
of those to be expected in future cases; and finally the significance of the
present decision as related to forthcoming railroad mergers.
In their earliest years, railroad companies in the United States were
controlled, in regard to combinations of all types, solely by state legislation. As a general rule, a railroad company had only the authority to
construct and operate its road, and could not dispose of it to another
company.' 0 Consequently, in order to validate the purchase of one railroad by another, one road had to have at least the power to buy, and the
other at least the power to sell, conferred by legislative authority."
Other less direct methods of combination, such as leasing, were similarly
outside the power to a railroad company, absent specific legislative autho12
rization.
As the railroads grew in size and number, and began to seek a lessening
of competition by combinations of various types, a policy arose against
such practices both through case law and specific constitutional and stat5 Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United States, 386 U.S. 372, 378 (1967).
6

Pennsylvania R.R.-Merger-New York Cent. R.R., 330 I.C.C. 328 (1967).
Erie-Lackawanna R.R. v. United States, 279 F. Supp. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
8 Penn-Cent. Merger and N. & W. Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 493 (1968).
7

9
See generally, Comment, 18 Sw. L.J. 439 (1964), for arguments advanced for and
against railroad mergers.
10 Branch v. Jesup, 106 U.S; 468 (1882).

11Louisville & N.R.R. v. Kentucky, 161 U.S. 677 (1896).
12 St. Louis, V. & T.H.R.R. v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., 145 U.S. 393,

(1892); Pittsburgh, C. and St. L.R.R. v. Keokuk and Hamilton Bridge Co., 131 U.S. 371 (1889).
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utory prohibition.' 8 To effectuate this policy, the Interstate Commerce
Act 14 was passed, initiating a much broader participation by the federal
government in the regulation of transportation. Antitrust laws were then
held applicable to the field of railroad mergers in 1904, and were effectively utilized to prevent these mergers until 1920,15 when Congress passed
the Transportation Act,' 6 which directed the Interstate Commerce Commission to "as soon as practicable prepare and adopt a plan for the consolidation of railway properties of the continental United States into a
limited number of systems." Competition was to be preserved as fully as
possible in formulating the plan, and all petitions for authorization to
consolidate (as distinguished from control by lease, purchase of stock,
etc.) could be approved only if in harmony with the plan. Further, all
consolidations thus approved were exempted from the operation of the
antitrust laws. 17 Professor William Z. Ripley of Harvard was retained
by the Commission to prepare such a plan.' 8 He presented it to the Commission in 1921, and finally in 1929 the Commission published a scheme
based on this proposal.' 9 While the 1920 legislation thus provided the
machinery for approval of railroad mergers, the initiation of proceedings
was left to the carriers, who at first were precluded by lack of formulation of the requisite plan, and later by disagreement with the plan it20
self.
18 State ex rel. Nolan v. Montana Ry., 21 Mont. 221, 53 P. 623 (1898).
1424 Stat. 379 (1887), 49 U.S.C.

§§ 1-40 (1964).

18Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904); United States v.

Union P.R.R., 226 U.S. 61 (1912); United States v. Lehigh V.R.R., 254 U.S. 255 (1920).
They had earlier been held applicable to railroads in other respects, e.g., price fixing,
United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States v.
Joint Traffic Ass'n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898). See generally, Conant, Railroad Consolidations
and the Antitrust Laws, 14 STAN. L. REV. 489 (1962); Phillips, Railroad Mergers:
Competition, Monopoly, and Antitrust, 19 WAsH. & LEE L. REv. 1 (1962).
1641 Stat. 480 (1920).
17 Id. at 481-82.
18 Riordan, A Railroad Merger-Dissected, 16 Bus. LAw. 577, 578 (1961).
19 Consolidation of Railroads: In the Matter of Consolidation of the Railway Properties of the United States into a Limited Number of Systems, 159 I.C.C. 522 (1929),
modified by Consolidation of Railroads: In the Matter of Consolidation of the Railway
Properties of the United States into a Limited Number of Systems, 185 I.C.C. 403
(1932).
20 From 1920 to 1929 the only railroad combination of significance was that of the
Chesapeake and Ohio and Pere Marquette, which was not accomplished under § 5(2),
but under § 5(6) of the 1920 Act, through a holding company called the Allegheny
Corporation. Proposed Control of Erie R.R. and Pere Marquette Ry. by Chesapeake &
0. Ry., 138 I.C.C. 517 (1928). From 1929 to 1940 (the life of the Plan) the only significant consolidation was that of two weak roads into the Gulf, Mobile & Ohio Railroad in 1939, and even this required a modification of the Commission's Plan before
it could be approved. Gulf, M. & 0. R. R. Merger, etc., 236 I.C.C. 61 (1939).
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The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 193321 eliminated the
different procedures for consolidation and control by means other than
consolidation, and allowed the Commission to approve applications if they
"promoted the public interest" and were in conformity with the plan; and
authorized the Commission to impose conditions to assure the promotion
22
of the public interest.
Congress later passed the Transportation Act of 194 0 ,s which is, in
substance, the present governing legislation. It elucidated the nation's
transportation policy, eliminated the requirement that the Commission
formulate a national plan, substituted the words "be consistent with the
public interest" for "promote the public interest," and again left initiation of proceedings up to the carriers.2 4 The Act stated four specific factors to be considered in passing upon proposed transactions, 2 5 and again
empowered the Commission to fix conditions for its approval, one of
26
which was specifically, inclusion of other railroads.
The 1940 Act, coupled with changing economic circumstances, especially
increased extramodal competition, forced the railroads to seriously consider
merger proceedings in the late 1950's. Two instances provide the background for the Penn-Central merger.
The first is the acquisition of control by the financially stronger C & 0
of the financially weaker B. & 0.,27 a combination of two roads whose
facilities were more complimentary than competitive. The second is the
merger of the N. & W. and the Nickel Plate. 28 These two proceedings
2148 Stat. 211 (1933). See generally, Fletcher, The Emergency Railroad Transportation Act-1933, 13 OaE. L. REv. 134 (1934); Perley, Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, 20 A.BA.J. 444 (1934).
2248 Stat. 211, 217 (1933).
2354 Stat. 898 (1940), 49 US.C. §§ 1-15 (1964).
2454 Stat. 899 (1940), preface to 49 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
2549 U.S.C. § 5(2)(c) (1964): "In passing upon any proposed transaction under the
provisions of this paragraph, the Commission shall give weight to the following considerations, among others: (1) The effect of the proposed transaction upon adequate
transportation service to the public; (2) the effect upon the public interest of the inclusion, or failure to include, other railroads in the territory involved in the proposed
transaction; (3) the total fixed charges resulting from the proposed transaction; and
(4) the interest of the carrier employees affected."
2649 U.S.C. § 5(2)(d) (1964). Of course, exemption from the operation of the antitrust laws was continued, 49 U.S.C. § 11 (1964). See generally, Florida E. C. Ry. v.
United States, 259 F. Supp. 993 (M.D. Fla. 1966), aff'd 386 U.S. 8 (1967); Minneapolis & St. L. Ry. v. United States, 361 U.S. 173 (1959); Note, 29 U. Cn,. L. REv. 276
(1960). See also, note, 41 N. D. L. Rxrv. 40 (1964), which traces a specific merger proceeding through the historical periods outlined above.
27
Chesapeake & 0. Ry.-Contro--Baltimore and O.R.R., 317 I.C.C. 261 (1962),
which report was sustained in Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees v. United States, 221 F. Supp. 19 (E.D. Mich. 1963), aff'd per curiam 375 U.S. 216 (1963).
28
Norfolk & W. Ry. and New York, C. & St. L. Ry.-Merger, 324 I.C.C. 1 (1964).
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resulted in the existence of four large rail systems in the northeast, the
two above, the PRR and NYC.
The N. & W. case is closely related to the Penn-Central merger because
that case also involved a provision for possible inclusion of three other
29
roads in the N. & W. system at a later date, the E-L, D. & H. and B. & M.
The Commission approved the N. & W. merger without requiring the immediate inclusion of any of the three, finding that as far as D. & H. and
B. & M. were concerned, "the proposed Norfolk & Western system should
have no harmful effects." 30° However, the Commission reserved jurisdiction
for five years following the N. & W. merger to permit inclusion of any or
all of the three roads in the N. & W. system.31 The three roads also petitioned for inclusion in the pending Penn-Central system. While the Commission left this avenue open, it found that "in each case an affiliation
'32
with the Norfolk & Western is preferred.
The Commission, after reviewing the record, approved the Penn-Central
merger on April 6, 1966. 83 The Commission agreed with its Examiners
that while the merger would result in a shifting of traffic patterns, the loss
of traffic to most of the railroads in the region would be offset by "the
creation of new traffic relationships between such non-participating carriers, their affiliates and non-aligned carriers, [so] that the net effect will
not be detrimental to such carriers." 34 But it differed with its Examiners
and refused to apply the same rationale to the E-L, D. & H. and B. & M.
Instead it formulated a set of "protective conditions," to protect the traffic and revenue of these three roads from adverse effects due to the merger,
based on its findings that:
More specifically, the Commission's order of June 24, 1964, authorized in addition to
the merger of the New York, Chicago and St. Louis Railroad Co. (Nickel Plate) into
the N. & W., the acquisition by N. & W. of the Wabash Railroad through lease and stock
control, the acquisition by N. & W. of stock control of the Akron, Canton & Youngstown
Railroad Co., the lease by N. & W. of the properties of the Pittsburgh & West Virginia
Railroad Co., and the purchase by N. & W. of the Sandusky line of PRR. The N. & W.
had earlier acquired the Virginia Railroad. Norfolk & Western Ry. Merger, etc., Virginia Ry., 307 I.C.C. 401 (1959).
29 E-L later withdrew its petition for inclusion due to an agreement with the N. & W.
that upon approval of its merger, the N. & W. would negotiate with E-L for some forzs
of combination. Norfolk & W. Ry. and New York, C. &'St. L. Ry-Merger, 324 I.C.C.
1, 19-20 (1964).
$Old. at 31.
31 "Consummation by the applicants of any transaction approved herein shall constitute on the part of such applicants acquiescence in and irrevocable assent to the conditions stated .... " Id. at 148.
82 Id.at 30.
33
4

Supra note 2.

O Supra note 2, ;t 481.
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It is doubtful that, without inclusion in a major system; these three carriers could
withstand the competition of the applicants merged, and, unless they are protected during the period necessary to determine their future, we would not authorize consummation at this time, even though approving the merger.8 5
The conditions were of two types, traffic and revenue.8 6 The traffic conditions required Penn-Central to maintain the rate and routing situation
as though there had been no merger in all cases where it was in competition with the three "protected roads." The revenue conditions required
Penn-Central to indemnify the three protected roads for loss of revenue
due to the merger.
At this juncture, various parties petitioned the Commission for reconsideration of its report and order. In essence, the three protected roads
sought more beneficial indemnification terms, as well as capital loss indemnification. 7 The "unprotected roads," on the other hand, contended
the conditions were illegal, 5 as agreements or combinations for the pooling or division of traffic or revenue without the requisite findings by the
Commission that such an arrangement is in the public interest.8 9 Further,
it was argued, since Penn-Central was to indemnify the protected roads
for traffic diverted to it and away from them, this would constitute a
"community of interest" whereby Penn-Central would seek to divert traffic to the protected roads to lessen the indemnification, while the protected
roads in turn would seek to divert traffic to Penn-Central to increase the
40
indemnification, all to the detriment of the unprotected roads.
E-L then filed suit to enjoin the merger, 4 ' as did numerous other parties. On September 19, 1966, in its Report on Reconsideration, 42 the Commission retained the traffic conditions but temporarily rescinded the indemnity conditions, pending further hearings which it concurrently ordered.
However, the Commission stated that if the indemnities were reintroduced,
85 Supra note 2, at 531-32.
86Supra note 2, at 561 ("Appendix G"); also in Baltimore and O.R.R. v. United
States, 18 L. Ed. 159, 174 (1967).
87 Capital loss indemnification means indemnification for the loss of value of the road
as a whole as a result of the Penn-Central merger. The protected roads were well aware
of the high probability they would eventually be included in some major system and
desired Penn-Central to bear any loss in their own overall value from the time of consummation of the Penn-Central merger to the time of such actual inclusion.
88 Jurisdictional Statement of the Baltimore and O.R.R. at 16, Baltimore and O.R.R.
v. United States, 386 U.S. 372 (1967).
8949 U.S.C. § 5(1)

(1964).

40 Supra note 38, at 8.
41 Supra note 3.
42 Supra note 4.
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they would be retroactive to the date of the merger, and that date would
not be altered.
The district court refused to enjoin the merger, but on appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed.43 The Court reasoned that the finding
that the merger was consistent with the public interest was based upon
Penn-Central's unqualified acceptance of the original protective conditions,
which meant those conditions were such as were contemplated by the
Commission 44 to be temporarily in force in lieu of immediate inclusion of
the three roads in a major system. Therefore, when the conditions were
in part rescinded on September 19th, without the issue of inclusion being
determined, the Commission, by its own findings, was authorizing a merger
which was not in the public interest. 45 The phraseology the Court chose
in stating its decision had, as will be shown, repercussions when the merger
48
was again approved.
On June 9, 1967, the Commission ordered the N & W system to include
the three protected roads within itself by acquisition of their stock, 47 and
at the same time again authorized immediate consummation of the PennCentral merger, imposing amended conditions to protect the three roads in
the interim between consummation of the Penn-Central merger and the actual inclusion of the three roads in a major system. 48 Suit was again filed
to enjoin the merger, 49 and an injunction was again denied by the district
court.50 The United States Supreme Court affirmed. 1
The Supreme Court lucidly noted that "[a] 11participants, with relatively
minor exceptions .

agreed that the merger itself would be in the public

43 Supra note S.
44

Supra note 2, at 532.

46Supra note 43, at 378.
46 Two passages from the opinion of the Court are in point: "We hold only that under
the uncontradicted findings of the Commission it was necessary for it to conclude the
inclusion proceedings, as to the protected railroads, prior to permitting consummation of
the merger. We believe that the Commission erred in approving the immediate consum-

mation of the merger without determining the ultimate fate of the protected roads."
(emphasis added).

Supra note 2.
47 Norfolk & W.R.R. and New York, C. & St. L.R.R.-Merger, etc., 330 I.C.C. 780,
796 (1967).
48 Supra note 6.

49 Supra note 7.
5O The arguments advanced against the merger do not vary substantially between the

1967 and 1968 cases, except for the issue presented by the language cited supra note 46.
Therefore, citations to the earlier case and the materials connected therewith are appropos.

51 Supra note 8.
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interest. There were sharp differences, however, with respect to certain
issues. These primarily concerned the provisions to be made for [the] three
smaller lines .... 12 Thus, the parties protesting did not oppose the
merger per se, but rather desired to be as certain as possible that they
would not be adversely affected by it.
The substance of the argument by the unprotected roads against the
merger was that the protective conditions established to benefit the three
small roads would adversely affect the unprotected roads. This was presented in three phases.
First, the unprotected roads contended Congress has prohibited such an
arrangement absent an "express finding" by the Commission that it fulfilled the statutory requirements set out by law.5 The Commission, on the
other hand, contended that this section did not apply to arrangements ordered by the Commission purely on its own initiative and against the
wishes of the carriers so ordered, but solely to consensual acts of carriers.54 The Supreme Court upheld the view of the Commission, and noted
that even if the section was applicable, the finding required was contained
implicitly in the Commission's report. 55 This is the first time the specific
question involved has been ruled upon by the Supreme Court, since the
instant case is the first time in which this type of condition has been
imposed in such a situation.5" The Court's ruling will doubtless encourage
the Commission to use this extremely flexible power in the future to protect smaller roads on an interim basis pending their later inclusion in a
system which will afford a superior position.
The second phase of the attack on the protective conditions was that,
even if they were legal, as applied here they created the "community of
interest" earlier referred to. The Court again accepted the Commission's
view, that as a finding of fact such was not the case because of the economic and geographical factors relevant to traffic diversion, noting that the
52 Supra note 8, at 494.

53 49 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1964): "Except upon specific approval by order of the Commission as in this section provided . .. it shall be unlawful for any common carrier subject
to this chapter ... to enter into any contract, agreement, or combination with any other
such common carrier or carriers for the pooling or division of traffic, or of service, or of
gross or net earnings . . . whenever the Commission is of opinion, after hearing upon
application of any such carrier or carriers or upon its own initiative, that the pooling or
division ... will be in the interest of better service to the public or of economy in operation, and will not unduly restrain competition, the Commission shall by order approve and
authorize, if asserted to by all the carriers involved, such pooling or division. ...."
54 Brief of the Interstate Commerce Commission at 71, Baltimore & O.R.R. v. United
States, 386 U.S. 372 (1967).
55

Supra note 8, at 513-14.

56 Supra note 54, at 25S.
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Commission had retained jurisdiction to reopen the proceedings and modify
57
the conditions if such practices should appear.
The third argument was that if the result envisioned by the unprotected
roads occurred, the Commission would be precluded from correcting it, because once having found these conditions to be necessary to preserve the
protected roads, it could not rescind them. 58 The Court did not specifically
deal with this objection, in part because its agreement with the Commission that the result envisioned by the unprotected carriers would not occur, precluded the issue. The Court also seems to imply that even if the
result envisioned did occur, there could be some modification of the conditions.
The Court's earlier decision gave rise to another issue argued by the
unprotected carriers. They reasoned that determination of the "ultimate
fate"159 of the three roads included the process of judicial review, and
since the Commission's order to the N. & W. to include the three roads
might be reversed at a later date, the merger could not be immediately
consummated in accordance with the earlier Supreme Court mandate. The
Court, however, citing another section of its earlier opinion,60 held it
meant only to require that the Commission make a decision admittedly
within its power as to the future of the three roads. It further stated
this did not require an "indeterminate delay ...pending the resolution of
the jockeying, negotiating and fighting among all of the parties concerned
and completion of the multitudinous procedures necessarily involved." 6' 1
This, like the question of the protective conditions, is the first time the
specific issue has been decided, again because it is the first time the Commission has utilized the procedure involved here. The Court found that the
public interest at stake was too important to allow a delay which would
serve mainly the interests of the other carriers.6 2 In so deciding it has set
a policy which will doubtless be cited as precedent in the future when
non-participating carriers seek to delay a merger while they "jockey" for
better position.
The appellant roads next argued that the order to N. & W. to include
the three roads in its system in no way bound the roads themselves to accept such iniclusion. Therefore, it was argued, the roads could reject inclu57

Sura note 8, at 514-15.
58 Bief for Bailtimore & O.R.R. at 36, Etie-Lackawanna k.R. V. United States, supr6
note Y.
59 Supra note 46.
60

Supra note 43, at 390.

61

Penn-Cent. Merger and N. & W. Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486, 517 (1968).

6

2Supra note 62.
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sion, leaving them outside a major system, the very situation the Commission found incompatible with the public interest.6 3 The district court
attempted, in essence, to dispose of this contention as a mere theoretical
possibility. 4 The Supreme Court did not even specifically consider what
would appear to be a valid objection, but rather hinted that the public
interest in consummating the Penn-Central merger, when weighed against
the likelihood of rejection of inclusion by any of the three roads, was
overriding. 5
Finally, the unprotected roads contended that the very facts which were
supposed to make the Penn-Central merger so vital to the public interest
(better service, lower costs, savings accruing to the roads involved, etc.)
would not occur immediately upon consummation due to the protective
traffic and revenue conditions imposed.66 Again, the Court did not specifically consider the point, but the answer of the Commission, that the
longer the consummation date of the merger was set back, so too would be
the date when such savings would begin, seems to be implicitly accepted
by the Court when it stresses so heavily the over-riding public interest in
immediate consummation.
The N. & W. raised certain arguments, somewhat peculiar to its own
situation, which will be briefly noted. First, it argued that while the Commission had decided that inclusion of all three of the protected roads in
the N. & W. system would be in the public interest, it had not decided
that inclusion of less than all three would fulfill this requirement. Since
all three might not accept inclusion, it was argued, the inclusion decision
was defective.6 7 The Court, however, found that the Commission's original
decision in the N. & W. merger case "clearly contemplates" action by one
or more roads for inclusion, and therefore the Commission's decision was
that inclusion of less than all three roads would still be in the public interest.0 8
Next, the N. & W. argued that the protective conditions were so attractive the three roads might decide to remain subject to them rather than accept inclusion. 9 The Court disposed of the issue briefly by noting that
6

3 Jurisdictional Statement of the Baltimore and O.R.R. at 13, Penn-Cent. Merger and
N &W Inclusion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).

64 Supra note
5

7, at 356-361.

O6Supra note 61, at 518.

o Supra note 63, at 26-28.
67 Jurisdictional Statement of the Norfolk & W. Ry. at 15-21, Penn-Cent. Merger
and N. & W. Inclusion Cases, supra note 63.
6
8Supra note 61, at 518.
69 Supra note 67.
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the Commission had, in the Court's opinion, sufficiently reserved jurisdiction in the case to alter the protective conditions if the situation N. & W.
70
feared in fact occurred.
Third, the N. & W. contended that the Commission's findings as to the
worth of the roads it was to include was not valid.71 While the N. & W.
in effect contended the price of the roads was too high, the B. & M. contended too low an estimate was placed on its value. The Court answered
both arguments by stating that this was merely a disagreement as to facts,
the decision of which Congress has entrusted to the Commission, and it
was therefore not within the purview of judicial review to reweigh the
72
findings of an administrative agency.
The Court also noted that in this case the Commission, pursuant to the
power it reserved in the original N. &. W. merger case, prescribed terms
rather than having the parties concerned work them out.73 This is the first
time the Commission has so acted. The Court upheld the Commission, observing it had the power to proceed as it did, and commenting that the
"exigencies of the situation" provided a suitable background for its use.
In so stating, the Court seems to have encouraged the Commission to reserve such broad jurisdiction in future cases, and to use its power rather
liberally.
The New York, New Haven and Hartford Railroad Company (NH), a
small road in the process of re-organization under the Bankruptcy Act,
was ordered included in the Penn-Central system by the Commission on
November 21, 1967, subject to the approval of the bankruptcy court. Further, the Penn-Central was to provide a loan to the NH and bear a fraction of its operating losses. 74 Certain NH bondholders objected to the
terms. The Court disposed of the matter by noting that while the interests of bondholders are entitled to respect, they do not override all else,
and in the instant case the bondholders were fortunate to have fared as
75
well as they did.
The objections of certain parties in Pennsylvania who opposed the
merger on its merits were briefly considered, but the court upheld the
70 The E-L's argument that it might be subject to traffic diversion by N & W was
analogously answered, i.e., the Commission could take appropriate steps to prevent or
remedy this.
71 Supra note 67, at 10-2 1.
72

Supra note 61, at 524.

7

3 Supra note 61, at 523.
74 Supra note 61, at 509.
75

Supra note 61, at 510-511; accord, Schwabacher v. United States, 334 U.S. 182
(1948); see generally, Stott v. United States, 166 F. Supp. 851 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) regarding the rights of minority stockholders in general in railroad merger cases.

1968]

CASE NOTES

view of the district court that these represented merely differences of
opinion with the Commission, and further, were precluded on procedural
76
grounds.
While recognizing that the point was not really at issue, the Court felt
compelled to reiterate that it is the duty of the Commission to decide
whether or not a given merger is in the public interest, and that the
courts, in judicially reviewing that decision, have only to decide whether
the administrative agency has acted in accordance with the law, and
whether its decision is supported by substantial evidence. 77
Mr. Justice Douglas dissented in part from the opinion of the Court,
arguing two main points: first, the Pennsylvania interests opposing the
merger on its merits were not properly heard; second, the Commission did
not make the necessary findings in regard to the NH to permit adequate
judicial review. The first argument concerns the fact that the merger and
inclusion proceedings were not dealt with as one issue, which may have resulted in unfairness. The second argument deals with whether the whole
NH situation was dealt with equitably by the Commission.7 8
The Penn-Central merger case thus seems to have decided several important questions. First, the pooling provisions set out by Congress 79 do
not apply to cases where the Commission orders inclusion of its own initiative and against the wishes of the carriers so ordered. Moreover, even
if the section is held to apply, the findings of the Commission would
ordinarily be sufficient to meet the requirements set out in that section.
Second, the Court seemingly encourages the Commission to retain broad
jurisdiction in railroad merger cases to deal equitably with situations which
may later develop,80 as for example, the alteration of protective conditions.
It has also encouraged retention of jurisdiction to prescribe terms, such as
those of inclusion, at a later date should the situation warrant it, rather
than allowing the parties concerned to negotiate them.
Third, the whole attitude of the Court appears to be one of overriding
concern with the public interest, such that it is reluctant to let objections
76
Supra note 61 at 505-507. But as Mr. Justice Douglas notes at some length in
his dissent, "The Court seemingly declares . . . a new rule of res judicata .... " Supra
note 8, at 541.
77 See, e.g., Illinois Central R.R. v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 385 U.S. 57, 69 (1966); accord, McLean Trucking Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944).
78 As to Mr. Justice Douglas' consideration of the procedural questions in regard to
the Pennsylvania interests, see supra note 76.

7949 U.S.C. § 5(1) (1964).
80 Citing the earlier case in

the Supreme Court, a federal district court has upheld this
power in regard to modifications of conditions relating to routing and solicitation of
traffic. Southern Pacific Co. v. United States, 277 F. Supp. 671, 675 (D. Neb. 1967).
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of other railroads, even those which are, in theory at least, valid, postpone
or prevent mergers which would otherwise serve the interest of the public.
Finally, the Court seems indisposed to allow protracted litigation by
community and private interests which it feels were duly heard by the
Commission.
Two notable points apparently are still undecided. Given that the Commission finds inclusion of certain roads to be necessary to the public interest, is this condition satisfied by providing an opportunity for inclusion even though the roads involved may reject it? Also, may parties be
precluded from litigating in multiple courts when a given court has allowed them to litigate therein? 8 ' The answers to these questions will no
doubt be forthcoming in the not too distant future.
S Supra note 8.
Gilbert Schroeder

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1866NEW STRENGTH FOR AN OLD LAW
In the summer of 1965, in response to an advertisement in the St. Louis
Post-Dispatch, Joseph Lee Jones, a Negro, and his wife, Barbara, visited
the Paddock Woods community of St. Louis County, Missouri for the purpose
of selecting a house and lot suitable to their needs. After investigating the
available homes, the Jones' offered to purchase a particular house and lot.
Defendants, through their agents, informed plaintiffs of their general policy
against selling houses and lots to Negroes, and in effect refused to consider
plaintiff's application to purchase a house. Plaintiffs then sought injunctive
and other relief' in the District Court for the Eastern District of Missouri,
alleging that the Alfred H. Mayer Co. 2 violated an act of Congress enacted
in the Civil Rights Act of 1866, now 42 U.S.C. section 1982,3 by its refusal
to sell them a home in the Paddock Woods community solely on account
of their color. 4 Both the district and appellate courts ruled that section 1982
1 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (4) (1962) gives the district court the power to award "damages
or . . . equitable or other relief under any Act of Congress providing for the protection
of civil rights . .. .
2 Alfred Realty Company, Paddock Country Club, and Alfred H. Mayer were also

respondents.
8 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1964): "All citizens shall have the same right, in every State
and Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property." See, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 (1964);
Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27.
4The petitioners also argued that there was sufficient entanglement of the Missouri
government in the licensing and use of state-controlled services for the subdivision to

